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Abstract 
Political will has become a ‘silver bullet’ in political science to explain the outcomes of public policy 
reforms. While success is seen as proof of its existence, failure is regularly attributed to a lack of 
political will. Political will is typically understood as originating from the personal characteristics 
and voluntary decisions of individual political leaders. In researching this still ambiguous concept, 
so far only few studies have attempted to systematically analyze the underlying factors that influ-
ence political will. Using a theoretical framework based on political economy, this large-N study 
argues that the incentive structure leaders face is crucial for building political will. Looking at the 
fight against the HIV/AIDS epidemic in 33 Sub-Saharan African countries, it is therefore examined 
which and to what extend country-specific factors influence political will. The study finds that in 
particular the scale of the epidemic, i.e. the degree to which political leaders are personally affected 
by the disease, exerts significant positive influence on their response. While the data provides some 
evidence that a higher degree of legitimacy of and stronger identification with the nation state 
increase political will as well, no support can be found for the hypothesis that the threats leaders 
face influence their political will. Democracy even turned out to have a negative impact on the 
political will to fight HIV/AIDS. 
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1. Introduction 
In recent years, the presence of political will has been identified as a precondition for a broad range 
of policy outcomes which are generally regarded as normatively desirable. Even more, political will 
has more and more become the “silver bullet in the fight against weak development performance” 
(Persson & Sjöstedt 2012, 617). However, whereas some countries always seem to bring up re-
sponsible leaders, other countries appear to be constantly doomed with kleptocratic ones. 
Stemming from this observation, scholars have argued that political will is shaped not only by 
voluntary, intrinsic motives and priorities, but to a considerable extent also by contextual factors 
which differ across countries, thus serving as an enabling environment for ‘good’ leaders. It has 
therefore been pointed out that to fully make sense of leaders’ political will, it is necessary to look 
into the “complex array of political, institutional, economic, social and cultural factors” 
(Brinkerhoff 2016, 481) which possibly have an influence on it. A better understanding of the 
determinants of political will can provide crucial help for researchers as well as well as practitioners 
who are confronted with the puzzle of how to build political will to pass and implement public 
policies (Fox et al. 2011). 
The present study therefore moves beyond these “personal idiosyncrasies” (Bor 2007, 1590). This 
is not to say that they are not important – quite obviously there are good and bad leaders. However, 
they seem not to be sufficient in explaining the variation in leadership qualities that can be observed 
empirically. The aim of this research is therefore to analyze, which factors influence leaders’ polit-
ical will to conduct reform?  
In order to answer the question “why do political leaders respond differently to a similar problem” 
(Dionne 2011, 57), it is necessary to first identify such a similar problem; for the countries in Sub-
Saharan Africa, HIV/AIDS is such a problem. It is by far the region with the highest prevalence 
rates in the world, even though there are of course differences within the region. Of the 45 African 
countries which reported prevalence rates, only the Comoros and Madagascar reported rates of 
less than 0.5% in 2010. Out of these 45, all but eight pass the 1% threshold of a ‘generalized 
epidemic’ 1. In comparison, outside of the region only 24 other countries reported a prevalence 
rate of 0.5% or more in 2010, of which only ten were above 1%. Furthermore, the 20 countries 
with the highest prevalence rates are without exception located in Sub-Saharan Africa (UNAIDS 
                                                          
1 Generalized epidemics stand in contrast or come together with ‘concentrated epidemics’ where HIV is well estab-
lished (prevalence over 5%) in high-risk subpopulations but not in the general population (WHO 2013). 
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2017b). In 2016, despite representing only 13% of the world’s total population, it is thus home to 
more than two thirds of the people living with HIV (UNAIDS 2017c).  
This study is limited to Sub-Saharan Africa2 not only because of the situation regarding HIV/AIDS, 
but also since the problem of seemingly unwilling leaders is particularly grave in this region. These 
countries seem to “produce poor leader after poor leader” (Goldsmith 2001, 77). Despite progress 
in recent years, many countries are still ruled by authoritarian, kleptocratic, neo-patrimonial leaders 
who appear to show little willingness to advance the lives of their citizens (Persson & Sjöstedt 
2012). From a methodological point of view, including only the 48 Sub-Saharan Africa countries 
reduces the risk of disregarded regional differences. Research suggests that regarding HIV/AIDS, 
the situation on the African continent is somewhat unique compared to other world regions 
(Gizelis 2009). 
Ever since the onset of the AIDS epidemic in the 1980s, political will has been identified as a main 
precondition for fighting it (Goldberg et al. 2012). It has been recognized as a political crisis that 
therefore requires a political solution (Bor 2007). Despite knowledge on how to curb the epidemic 
as well as the availability of financial resources to do so, there has been substantial variation across 
countries in the way political leaders respond to the crisis (Scott 2000). Even as the spreading of 
the epidemic has passed its peak, “political commitment to confront AIDS in developing countries 
remains tragically uneven and on the whole inadequate” (Bor 2007, 1585). In fact, in fighting the 
disease political will is becoming more important than ever. As international donors are gradually 
decreasing their HIV funding, national governments have to take more responsibility for providing 
resources as well as initiating and sustaining programs (Brinkerhoff 2016). 
Even among countries with similar structural conditions, responses have been highly uneven. While 
some countries exceed expectations, others have fallen short of the performance that could be 
expected from them (Gore et al. 2014). While it is not denied that “much of the variation in AIDS 
leadership stems from the inspiration, skill, and charisma of individual leaders […] Structural fac-
tors are critical to understanding what are often taken to be the voluntary actions” (Bor 2007, 1598) 
of political leaders. It is therefore highly doubtful “whether a different person faced with the same 
AIDS epidemic operating under the same institutional constraints on political leadership would 
pursue a different path” (Dionne 2011, 56). This thesis therefore seeks to answer the question, 
which and to what extent contextual factors influence the political will of leaders to fight 
HIV/AIDS? 
                                                          
2 The classification of Sub-Saharan African countries is according to the United Nations Statistics Division (2017). 
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The units of observation in this study are the chief executives of countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
In most cases this is the president but depending on the country it may also be the prime minister 
or another government official. Scholars have repeatedly stressed the importance and critical role 
of the national top-level government when it comes to curbing HIV/AIDS (Putzel 2004; Bor 2007; 
Goldberg et al. 2012; Gore et al. 2014). They formulate policies, distribute resources and negotiate 
donor cooperation. This is especially the case for developing countries where the state is typically 
the primary funder and in many cases primary provider of health services (Kruk & Freedman 2008). 
This is not to say that success or failure of any action (or the absence thereof) can solely be at-
tributed to a single political leader, not least since most responses to the epidemic include both 
governmental and nongovernmental actors (Zalmanovitch & Cohen 2015), however “national gov-
ernments enjoy sovereignty, and ultimately hold responsibility for what goes on within their terri-
tories” (Desmond et al. 2008, 109). 
By using a theoretical framework based on political economy and running multivariate regressions, 
this paper analyzes how contextual factors, namely the threats political leaders face, the level of 
democracy, legitimacy of and identification with the nation state as well as the scale of the epidemic 
shape the political will to fight HIV/AIDS. The dependent variable, political will, is operationalized 
as the change in coverage with AIDS medication. The study finds that the scale of the epidemic 
and to some extent the legitimacy of and identification with the nation state exert a positive influ-
ence on political will. For the other two hypotheses regarding the threats to leaders and the level 
of democracy the data offer no or too little support. 
The thesis proceeds as follows: after giving some general information on HIV/AIDS and the 
unique features of the epidemic, the existing literature on political will in general and in relation to 
the disease in particular will be reviewed. Following this, the theoretical framework is expounded, 
out of which four hypotheses are developed. I will then elaborate on the research design as well as 
the choice of variables and their measurement, before presenting the results of the regression anal-
ysis. The study will finish with some concluding remarks as well as the limitations of the study and 
avenues for future research. 
 
2. HIV/AIDS in Sub-Saharan Africa 
The Acquired Immune Deficiency Syndrome (AIDS) is a communicable disease, caused by infec-
tion with the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV). For the remainder of this paper therefore the 
term HIV/AIDS is used, to refer to both conditions. Globally, 1.0 million AIDS-related deaths 
were reported in 2016. However, this number has fallen by nearly 50% since the peak around 2005, 
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when almost 2 million people died of the disease. In the last three to four decades since its outbreak, 
the epidemic has cost the lives of 35 million people. Almost 37 million more people are currently 
living with the disease, with 1.8 million new infections in 2016 – a number which has been relatively 
stable since 2010. Even though substantial progress has been made during the last decade, for all 
these numbers Sub-Saharan Africa still occupies a sad first place: 25.5 million people in the region 
are currently living with the disease. 1.2 million people got newly infected in 2016 and 730,000 died 
due to it (all UNAIDS 2017c). The urgency of the issue is further underlined by the fact that com-
bating the disease is an explicit target of Goal 6 of the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) 
and Goal 3 of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). 
One reason for the sharp decrease in the number of deaths and the increase in the number of 
people living with the disease is the progress in coverage and effect of so-called antiretroviral ther-
apy (ART3). This ‘cocktail’ of medical drugs can increase life expectancy and life quality of people 
with HIV/AIDS considerably (Justesen 2012). The drugs suppress the growth of the virus and 
therefore the progression of the disease. However, even though ART also prevents mother-to-
child transmission of the virus and reduces the infectivity of people receiving treatment, this should 
not mislead over the fact that, once infected, there is still no cure for the disease. 
Due to the very long period of latency of HIV, infected people can live without any symptoms for 
eight to nine years, before the outbreak of AIDS (Poku & Whiteside 2004; Dionne 2011). There-
fore, even in rural areas with no access to treatment, people can on average live for ten years after 
the infection. This stands in sharp contrast to diseases like malaria or Ebola which take considerably 
shorter time to manifest. This feature also contributes to the rapid spreading of the virus, especially 
in the early years of the epidemic. Globally, still almost a third of those who are infected are not 
aware of their status and therefore unconsciously transmit the virus to others over an extended 
period of time (UNAIDS 2017a; Gizelis 2009).  
However, for the countries affected by the disease it is not merely an individual health problem. It 
is the devastating economic, social and political consequences for societies at large that it entails 
which make it such a disaster (Scott 2000; Gizelis 2009). As the disease disproportionately affects 
younger people, societies plagued by it get robbed of their most productive parts of the population 
which are the hardest to replace and it prevents the accumulation of human capital (Gizelis 2009; 
Justesen 2012). This therefore has the potential to deteriorate a country’s economic base and ham-
                                                          
3 Antiretroviral therapy is sometimes also referred to as ARV (antiretroviral) drugs or HAART (highly active an-
tiretroviral therapy). However, ART is the term used by most actors, including UNAIDS. 
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pers economic growth. Besides these economic implications, there are also severe social conse-
quences. With life expectancy dropping sharply, orphans grow up unsupported on their own or 
under the care of relatives who are often in need of care themselves. 
A main challenge when it comes to fighting the epidemic is that there is still stigma surrounding 
the disease, as it is “associated with behaviors frequently viewed as immoral and/or socially unde-
sirable” (Brinkerhoff 2016, 481). People infected are therefore subject to fears and prejudices. 
Much of the stigma is around the act of getting tested itself, as this is understood as a sign of a 
sexually promiscuous lifestyle, drug usage or homosexuality (Putzel 2004). Many people, especially 
in traditional, rural communities, are therefore reluctant to reach clarification on their status. 
Fighting HIV/AIDS is a complex endeavor, as it involves various components on different levels 
like preventive measures, testing and counseling facilities, blood banks and blood safety as well as 
providing and correctly conducting treatment with ART and PMTCT (Prevention of Mother-to-
Child Transmission4) (Gore et al. 2014). However, in spite of these rather technical challenges, the 
real difficulty to fighting it is posed by social and cultural aspects. Many policies to stop the spread-
ing of the disease are personally demanding, as they infringe on very personal and private aspects 
of life and require profound changes in behavior, especially with regard to sexual activities 
(Lieberman 2007; Brinkerhoff 2016). As people have to deal with information and practices they 
may perceive as embarrassing, disturbing and thus undesirable, there may be resistance to such 
policies, even if they are ‘right’ (Zalmanovitch & Cohen 2015). 
Ever since its onset, political will has been identified as being crucial in the fight against the 
HIV/AIDS epidemic. One reason for this is that due to the long wave nature of the disease, there 
are only few public health issues that demand the same kind of long-term commitment by govern-
ments (Brinkerhoff 2016). Facing scarce resources and capacities, any such commitment might 
come at the expense of fighting other causes of death that are much more immediate (Putzel 2004). 
Despite the complexity described here, fighting the epidemic is not “rocket science” (Kjørven 
2010). Unlike for other reform projects, e.g. the fight against corruption, there is a clear path to-
wards success. Whenever there is sufficient and genuine political will, results should follow (Fox et 
al. 2011). Not least because best practices have been established after almost 30 years of fighting 
the epidemic, which, again, is not the case for anti-corruption efforts. Furthermore, unlike for other 
policy interventions, the necessity of fighting the epidemic is now universally accepted on the global 
level. This stands in sharp contrast to controversial issues like economic policy or bureaucratic 
                                                          
4 Occasionally PMTCT is also referred to as MTCTP (Mother-to-Child Transmission Prevention). 
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reforms, as for example experienced with structural adjustment programs in the 1990s which were 
often perceived as being prescribed by donor organizations (Goldsmith 2001; Brinkerhoff 2016). 
 
3. Literature review 
3.1. Political will 
Failure by governments to take action has regularly been blamed on a lack of political will (Post et 
al. 2010; Persson & Sjöstedt 2012). Similarly, the few success stories in the developing world like 
Botswana, Singapore or Hong Kong “are commonly attributed to the deft guidance of ‘a handful 
of heroes’” (Persson & Sjöstedt 2012, 626). This pattern can be observed for the reactions to the 
AIDS epidemic as well. As will be seen later, especially the comparison between Uganda’s president 
Museveni and president Mbeki from South Africa is a popular theme in the literature. Despite the 
growth of literature in recent years, political will remains an ambiguous concept and it is still not 
clear what this “magical, missing ingredient” (Scott 2000, 577) exactly is. This ambiguity of the 
term makes “it ideal for achieving political aims and for labeling political failures when the diagnosis 
is unclear” (Post et al. 2010, 654).  
While there is agreement on the centrality of the concept for policy-making and policy outputs, 
scholars (as well as practitioners) have been struggling to agree on a common definition of political 
will due to its complexity and multidimensionality (Brinkerhoff 2016; Post et al. 2010). Even 
though it is sometimes treated as a dichotomous concept which one either does or does not have 
(Putzel 2004), Post et al. (2010) as well as Youde (2007) point out that political will is something 
continuous. This is of importance for measuring it. However, often there is a certain threshold of 
a ‘big enough’ political will which needs to be reached in order to achieve certain binary outcomes, 
e.g. passing a public policy. As Post et al. (2010) furthermore note, there is nothing like a ‘general 
political will’. Political will always relates to a particular problem and the particular policy solution 
for this. However, leaders often tend to resort to “short-term fixes” (Post et al. 2010, 666) which 
do not address the problem at hand properly. Any definition of political will therefore needs to 
include the criteria of long-term commitment (Brinkerhoff 2000; 2016; Persson & Sjöstedt 2012; 
Post et al. 2010). 
One issue regarding political will is whether the focus should be on individuals, or if it is a group-
level concept. Brinkerhoff (2016; 2000) identifies both individuals and collectives as possible bear-
ers of political will. Yet he notes that when the impetus for policy action does not come from the 
political leader himself or herself, it is always doubtful whether the political will is genuine or not. 
According to Post et al. (2010), it is always a group phenomenon, since the aggregation of different 
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actors’ preferences is key in the process. Unless someone was a totalitarian dictator, one individual’s 
personal intentions and interests would never be sufficient to implement them and therefore to 
qualify as political will. While there is some merit to this assessment, it is incomplete as it ignores 
the fact that there are always actors who have more power than others and whose ‘personal political 
will’ therefore has a bigger weight. Bor (2007) for example therefore clearly limits his understanding 
of political will to the highest level of political decision-making. However, Gore et al. (2014) also 
stress the crucial role of the bureaucracy, as the state cannot be limited to the role of political 
leadership. The institutional arrangements of a country remain intact, even when individuals 
change. That being said, especially in developing countries, where these institutions are not as 
deeply entrenched, changes tend to be bigger and more prevalent in the event of a new leadership. 
The degree to which they can constrain the actions of individual leaders is therefore comparatively 
low. 
Related to this, there has been some discussion, whether a state’s capacity should be included in 
the concept of political will. Post et al. argue that an “outcome-based concept must incorporate 
capacity” (2010, 656), as otherwise mere rhetoric would be a sufficient condition for political will. 
Fox, Goldberg, Gore and Bärnighausen on the other hand have repeatedly argued against this 
(Gore et al. 2014; Goldberg et al. 2012; Fox et al. 2011), stressing that it is rather important to 
clearly distinguish between the two concepts. Instead of being part of it, they postulate that “state 
capacity modiﬁes or mediates” (Fox et al. 2011, 7) the effects of political will. I agree with this 
understanding that capacity should be expected to have an influence on the outcome, but that it 
has to be separated from political will. Post et al. are right that for genuine political will, initiatives 
have to be provided with appropriate resources. Denying these resources – assuming they are avail-
able, which can be expected to pose a problem particularly in the Sub-Saharan African context – 
would mean intentionally undermining the program. However, some of the most important aspects 
of state capacity (e.g. the capacity of the bureaucracy), cannot reasonably be expected to be easily 
changed by a leader in the short term (Geddes 1994). This will be picked up again later, when 
discussing the research design. 
Stemming from these considerations, the definition proposed by Brinkerhoff (2016, 472) will be 
used for the purpose of this thesis, according to which political will is understood as “the commit-
ment of actors to undertake actions to achieve a set of objectives […] and to sustain the costs of 
those actions over time”. Brinkerhoff (2000; 2016) also disaggregates his definition of political will 
into different components. Regarding anti-corruption measures his model comprises five compo-
8 
nents and, to fit the specific demands for HIV/AIDS programs, was later expanded to seven com-
ponents. However, these models are more apt for usage in qualitative studies, as they consider 
specific technicalities of particular campaigns.  
Political will is usually understood as stemming from personal characteristics, this is the leaders’ 
individual values, courage or motivations (Zalmanovitch & Cohen 2015; Youde 2007; Brinkerhoff 
2016). However, this focus on personal traits has been criticized as an “excessively voluntaristic 
view of leaders” (Persson & Sjöstedt 2012, 618), since it ignores the structural factors which exert 
considerable influence on their behavior and therefore makes any further analysis of the origins 
redundant. By neglecting the context, one has to arrive at the simplistic and deceptive conclusion 
of labelling every leader who failed to implement reforms as a liar who never had genuine political 
will in the first place (Persson & Sjöstedt 2012). This argument, however, does not offer an expla-
nation for the observation that some countries seem to always bring up responsible leaders, while 
other countries are constantly doomed with poor ones. While much of the variation regarding 
political will stems from personal factors, environmental factors are central “to understanding what 
are often taken to be the voluntary actions of government leaders” (Bor 2007, 1598). Youde (2007, 
2–3) accounts it to the widespread dichotomous understanding of political will that “blinds us to 
understanding the origins of political will and the incentive structures that may encourage or dis-
courage action on a particular issue” and therefore why countries eventually experience different 
policy outcomes. 
Yet, even though the importance of the origins of political will has been stressed repeatedly, little 
research has been conducted to actually explore these. A meaningful contribution comes from 
Persson and Sjöstedt (2012, 618) who come up with a theoretical framework, based on principal-
agent theory and state theory, with which they “move away from the voluntaristic and circular 
approach” that ignores those factors beyond leaders’ personal traits. In particular, the framework 
highlights the crucial role of the underlying social contract in shaping leadership behavior. 
3.2. HIV/AIDS and political will 
The lack of studies on the origins of political will can be noticed for the subject of HIV/AIDS as 
well. A further and related issue with the literature on responses to the epidemic is that it is pre-
dominated by qualitative studies. The main problem with this is that they tend to focus on the same 
group of countries. For Sub-Saharan Africa it is in particular the “iconic cases” (Gore et al. 2014, 
108) of Uganda as an example of bright and South Africa as an example of poor leadership (e.g. 
Putzel 2004; Gauri & Lieberman 2006; Brinkerhoff 2016; Youde 2007; Campbell 2010; Parkhurst 
& Lush 2004). For this reason, it is at least questionable, to what degree these findings are gener-
alizable for the other countries in the region. Considering this lean towards case studies and the 
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dearth of systematic tests in the existing literature, a quantitative cross-country analysis could pro-
vide additional generalizable evidence and thus help filling an important gap. In his case study on 
Uganda, Putzel (2004) for example carves out some of the reasons, why president Museveni 
showed such a strong political will to fight the epidemic. It was the incentive structure he faced at 
the time that permitted action against the disease. Since the government had little to lose from 
doing so, the benefits outweighed the political costs of the intervention. 
Bor (2007) is one of the few authors studying the origins of political will quantitatively. He includes 
some independent variables that are also included in this study, namely when it comes to political 
institutions. However, in his analysis, he also includes many variables, for which he does not offer 
a convincing and coherent theoretical explanation on how they influence the formation of political 
will. This is particularly true for factors like the income-level or government effectiveness. As will 
be outlined later, these rather constitute control variables, instead of explanatory variables them-
selves. Besides that, some parts of the literature have used quantitative methods to examine coun-
tries “relative responses” (Desmond et al. 2008) to the epidemic, given their structural conditions 
and capabilities (Nattrass 2008; Gizelis 2009; Desmond et al. 2008). Yet none of these papers is 
directly related to the question of political will. Instead, they just compile a set of variables that 
might modify the response, without a particular underlying theoretical framework.  
Despite this lack of focus on the origins of political will, studies from recent years have looked into 
what factors influence the responses to HIV/AIDS in general. A lot of attention has been paid to 
the impact of democracy, respectively the regime type, on fighting HIV/AIDS. So far, these studies 
have produced mixed results. Whereas Gizelis (2009) finds a relationship between the level of the 
democracy and better responses to the epidemic, other authors have more qualified results. Ac-
cording to Justesen (2012), the effect of democracy only differs substantially from autocracies in 
those countries which have a proportional electoral system. The results by Nattrass (2008) become 
insignificant, once controlled for regional effects. The same is true for Bor (2007) who measures 
“electoral accountability” – the main feature of democratic systems. Once controlled for other 
factors, the variable becomes insignificant. For the case of Uganda, Putzel (2004) even argues that 
the lack of competitive elections was one of the reason for the government’s successful campaign 
to tackle the epidemic. Relating to the issue of elections, Zalmanovitch and Cohen (2015) claim 
that it is the characteristics of health promotion policies in general that curb politicians’ motivation 
to become active, as quick and tangible achievements are rare and political cost high. However, 
they do not test this proposition empirically. 
Another well-established branch within the literature deals with time horizons leaders are facing. 
Unlike with democracy, there is largely agreement among scholars. Dionne (2011) for the specific 
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case of HIV/AIDS and Goldsmith (2001) when it comes to economic liberalization and corruption 
find that countries with leaders expecting to stay in office longer perform better. Putzel (2004) 
makes similar observations regarding the successful campaign to fight HIV/AIDS in Uganda, since 
the power of president Museveni and his military organization was essentially undisputed. These 
findings are also in with the argument put forward by Olson (1993). 
Lieberman (2007) stresses the importance of ethnic politics. In ethnically divided societies, leaders 
are more likely to attribute the disease to other groups and/or downplay the risk for the own group 
in order not to be connected to the stigma and uphold the own group’s reputation. In turn, de-
creasing demand for action and potentially increasing resistance to it negatively affect governments’ 
responses to the epidemic.  
This thesis expands the on existing research by analyzing the origins of political will. Using a co-
herent theoretical framework, it will bring together various factors that are likely to influence po-
litical will. Unlike previous works, this will involve a clear, theoretically grounded distinction be-
tween factors influencing political will and those factors modifying the outcome after political will 
has been built. It will furthermore contribute to the literature by using quantitative methods. This 
will add to the question, whether the results from previous case studies are generalizable for the 
large group of countries that have not been covered in such. 
 
4. Theory 
To explain the variety in the responses to the HIV/AIDS epidemic that can be observed empiri-
cally, the present study draws on a theoretical explanation based on political economy. As not even 
the most powerful leaders operate in a political vacuum, their political will and eventually their 
behavior is influenced by the incentive structure they face (Persson & Sjöstedt 2012). From this 
perspective, the countries’ political leaders are understood as rational actors who seek to maximize 
their own self-interests (Goldsmith 2001). First and foremost that means ensuring their own polit-
ical survival by preserving their power and authority (Geddes 1994; Zalmanovitch & Cohen 2015; 
Dionne 2011). Maybe even more important than incentives are disincentives. The institutional and 
circumstantial context can create disincentives which may not only lead to a lack of political will, 
but even to negative political will (Brinkerhoff 2010; Geddes 1994). That means the question is 
less, why some leaders have the political will to pursue certain policies, in this case to fight 
HIV/AIDS, but much more, why others do not. Leaders’ political will, and thus the strategies they 
chose, is therefore subject to careful political cost-beneﬁt calculations, while also keeping in mind 
the possible risks involved (Lohmann 2008; Goldsmith 2001). However, in no way does this imply 
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that their calculations are always correct due to misperceptions or imperfect information (bounded 
rationality) (Simon 1957). The total extent of the political will therefore depends on the specific 
incentive structure which a leader is facing, yet still and, as previously mentioned, to some extent 
also on the leader specific qualities. 
Virtually every policy choice produces a new set of winners, who benefit from the change, and 
losers, who will be worse off afterwards (Acemoglu & Robinson 2006). While the beneficiaries 
often do not know how much they win, the other side is well aware of their potential losses (Mette 
Kjaer 2004). Reformers therefore face more opposition than support. Mustering political will can 
be expected to be particularly difficult, when the planned actions would produce powerful losers 
on the one hand, but only weak winners on the other. Whereas the losers in this case can mobilize 
their resources to oppose the change, the winners do not have equal capacity to back the plans 
(Brinkerhoff 2000). In the particular case of broad-based HIV/AIDS policies, the winners often 
belong to groups that are stigmatized and relatively powerless. Political will therefore needs to 
“clear a high motivational hurdle that other policies that create widely distributed and non-contro-
versial beneﬁts do not face” (Brinkerhoff 2016, 482). 
 
Figure 1. Theoretical mechanism on the effect of contextual factors on political will 
In the following, three possible channels are presented how political will is shaped: leaders’ time 
horizon, legitimacy of and identification with the nation state, as well as the scale of the epidemic 
(see Figure 1), resulting in four hypotheses. Some of them overlap to a certain extent, however, the 
way how the incentives work is different, for which reason it makes sense to analytically differen-
tiate between them. Similar to the work by Persson and Sjöstedt (2012), these will include both 
macro (e.g. national identity) and micro (e.g. leaders’ time horizon) explanations, whereas the macro 
level refers to the “broader social and political forces [that] affect the opportunity and incentive 
structure leaders face” (Persson & Sjöstedt 2012, 622). However, this sharp distinction cannot al-
ways be upheld throughout the analysis as boundaries between both dimensions can be fluid. 
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4.1. Political leaders’ time horizon 
According to Olson (1993), time is key, as time horizons are an integral part of the incentive struc-
ture leaders are facing. The shorter leaders can reasonably expect to stay in power, meaning the 
shorter their time horizon is, the more likely they are to refrain from actions which will not yield 
benefits during their time in office. Instead, with such little certainty about their future they have 
strong incentives for short-term enrichment, by taking their pay-offs while still in office and as 
much as possible (Dionne 2011; Bor 2007; Goldsmith 2001). Olson hypothesizes that leaders in 
such situations not only enrich themselves, but also favor members of their own ethnic group, as 
it is now their ‘turn to eat’ in office. The possible influence of ethnicity will be discussed in more 
detail later again. A lack of political will therefore is not necessarily a sign that the leader is a ma-
levolent liar, but, depending on the context, it can rather be understood as rational behavior, if not 
even the only possible rational behavior (Persson & Sjöstedt 2012). There are at least two distinct 
ways how time horizons are shaped, by the threats leaders face to their rule and the incentives 
posed by democracy. These will now be presented in more detail. 
4.1.1. Threats to political leaders 
Despite improvements in the last decade, compared to other world regions office holders in Sub-
Saharan Africa in general still face shorter time horizons, as for most of them the risk of being 
ousted through a coup is a threat they have to acknowledge (Barka & Ncube 2012). Most worri-
some for them is that they do not know when that day may come. As history shows, whereas some 
leaders are overthrown already after a couple of weeks or months, others manage to cling to power 
for multiple decades (Goldsmith 2001), most recently Robert Mugabe who was removed after rul-
ing Zimbabwe for 37 years. This threat can for example be posed by the military, but also by 
religious authorities or ultimately public rebellion (Gandhi & Przeworski 2007; Post et al. 2010). 
Even when being de jure out of any formal government power, these actors can have substantial 
threat potential for the sitting government as they are powerful and often resistant to change (Post 
et al. 2010; Brinkerhoff 2000). It is thus these “exigencies of political survival” (Geddes 1994, 19) 
which should be expected to deter planning for the long term and cause them to undermine devel-
opment goals. 
In this regard, it is important to also consider the avenues of exit from power leaders have at their 
disposal. This means that they can anticipate what happens to them when they lose office. Again, 
the situation in Sub-Saharan Africa is particularly grave, as in the large majority of cases, leaders 
who fall to coups get murdered, jailed or exiled (Goldsmith 2001). In functioning democracies, 
elections contribute to giving leaders certainty about their future. Not only do regular and institu-
tionalized elections provide them with a clear date, on when and how transition might occur and 
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they lose power, they also soften the punishment that comes with this loss (Goldsmith 2001; 
Brinkerhoff 2000). Unlike with falling to a coup, the risk for the loser of a democratic election of 
getting executed, prisoned or exiled is pretty much nonexistent. Leaders who have a safe way out 
of power and prospect of a life as ‘normal’ citizen after their term should therefore be expected to 
behave less kleptocratic while in office, as well as more likely to invest in the long-term, since they 
have to worry less about how to cling to power. However, this is not the main mechanism, how I 
expect democracy to shape the incentive structure for political leaders. It will therefore be discussed 
again, in more detail below. 
These considerations have important implications for the case of HIV/AIDS, with the specific 
features of the disease even exacerbating the problem of short time horizons. As mentioned above, 
one of the characteristics is the long latency phase between the HIV infection and the outbreak of 
the AIDS disease – even without ART treatment. Leaders with a short time horizon, can therefore 
assume that they will neither reap the benefits of such a long-term intervention during their term, 
nor the negative long-term consequences of not addressing the problem (Bor 2007; Dionne 2011). 
At best, activities and resources can be expected to be focused on areas which yield faster results 
for them (Geddes 1994). Limited to the field of public health, those could for example be other 
diseases with much shorter latency periods compared to AIDS, such as malaria, Ebola or tubercu-
losis (Putzel 2004). However, due to short-term enrichment of the leaders, money devoted to in-
tervening against the epidemic, or at least parts of it, regularly also ends up in the pockets of the 
ruling elite.  
My first hypothesis therefore is as follows: 
H1 The higher the threat for political leaders to be overthrown, the lower is their political will 
to fight HIV/AIDS. 
4.1.2. Democratic incentives 
As already touched upon, turnovers as the result of elections in established democracies give lead-
ers more certainty about their future and therefore extend their time horizon. However, this is not 
the main mechanism how I expect democracy to shape political will. The main characteristic of 
democratic countries is that leaders have to get re-elected to stay in office. To maximize their 
chances for this to happen, they therefore have incentives to cater for the needs of the population 
and be responsive to their demands (Justesen 2012). This facilitates a “bottom-up convergence of 
public opinion and political will” (Post et al. 2010, 664). Authoritarian leaders do not face this kind 
of incentive. This is not to say that leaders in non-democracies can ignore the needs of their pop-
ulation completely. Yet, whereas they usually base their political survival on the support of just a 
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small and powerful elite, democratic leaders need to accommodate a much bigger part of the pop-
ulation to remain in office (Bueno de Mesquita et al. 2002; Gizelis 2009; Brinkerhoff 2016; Dionne 
2011). Therefore, it can be expected that they have incentives to provide public goods to the general 
population. Leaders in more authoritarian states on the other hand do not have to fear electoral 
repercussion. It can therefore be expected that particular goods are only targeted at a small elitist 
circle as well as loyal supporters (Justesen 2012).  
In terms of the principal-agent based framework of Persson and Sjöstedt, citizens therefore take 
on the role of a “principled principal” (2012, 622) and are thus able to shape the incentive structure 
of political leaders to a considerable extent. In a well-functioning democracy, especially the poorer 
and less powerful segments of the population should be expected to have a bigger influence on 
political will. This is even more so, when they pose a large number of the electorate which is the 
case in many countries in Sub-Saharan Africa. This should be of particular importance for the issue 
of HIV/AIDS in the region, since in recent years the disease more and more has become a disease 
disproportionally affecting the poor (Bor 2007). Another typical feature that can be found in de-
mocracies is the existence of a free press and operating space for civil society organizations. The 
media can “generate transparency of crisis conditions and inescapable incentives for leaders to 
intervene” (Bor 2007, 1590), as well as serve as a catalyst, by putting the issue on the public’s and 
therefore the government’s agenda (Justesen 2012; Putzel 2004). Civil society activists on the other 
hand can represent otherwise marginalized and vulnerable groups and advocate for their cause 
(Brinkerhoff 2016). Due to the stigma surrounding HIV/AIDS, this channel should be particularly 
important. In addition to that, civil society can back reform-oriented leaders which is of particular 
importance for sustaining political will over time (Brinkerhoff 2000, 246). 
All these considerations suggest the following hypothesis: 
H2 The more democratic a country, the higher are the incentives for leaders to engage in the 
fight against HIV/AIDS. 
However, for electoral accountability to work in the theorized way, it is necessary that fighting 
HIV/AIDS actually is an issue of importance for the voters. There is evidence from some Sub-
Saharan African countries that this is not the case. Even for people who are most affected by 
HIV/AIDS, fighting it tends not to be among the most pressing issues (Dionne 2011; Bor 2007). 
Citizens especially tend to fail to see the link between the disease and broader economic and social 
issues described before – paradoxically those are the very issues named the top priorities in surveys 
(Gizelis 2009). Post et al. (2010, 664) add that “not all constituents know what they want or com-
municate those desires [and] not all constituents want the same thing”. According to Zalmanovitch 
and Cohen (2015), this is not unique to HIV/AIDS and developing countries, but rather a general 
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feature of the field of public health that can also be observed in established western democracies. 
As such policies tend not to be popular with the voters and political benefits therefore are low, it 
is only rational for leaders not to get involved in them too much. The observation that the elec-
torate tends to have a short memory, therefore being unlikely to reward long-term commitments 
such as the fight against HIV/AIDS further adds to the problem (Dionne 2011). Especially social 
problems “appear on and disappear from the public agenda rapidly” (Post et al. 2010, 662). 
4.2. Legitimacy of and identification with the nation state 
As already touched upon, ethnicity should be expected to have an influence on political will. There 
are at least two channels, through which this factor can incentivize leaders’ political will to respond 
to the disease.  
Firstly, ethnic fractionalization often goes together with little legitimation of and identification with 
the nation state, respectively the central government as its representative. Due to its colonial his-
tory, this is particularly the case in Sub-Saharan Africa. States that are not considered legitimate by 
all its citizens, lack a shared social contract between these two parties (Persson & Sjöstedt 2012). 
In such states, citizens therefore fail to coordinate due to different interests and experiences and 
leaders face only very little incentive to pursue the public good. Instead, the state is regarded by 
them as a mere “‘alien’ institution to be appropriated” (Persson & Sjöstedt 2012, 625) and to serve 
the own ethnic group while holding the office. 
It should be noted that even though ethnicity is the most common reason for the lack of a shared 
social contract in Sub-Saharan Africa, it is not necessarily the only one. For the case of HIV/AIDS 
this means that government spending as well as (possible) donor aid should be expected not to be 
devoted to programs fighting the epidemic, but instead going into the pockets of the ruling elite. 
Alternatively, it is thinkable that spending is targeted towards certain ethnic groups, instead of 
benefiting the general population. 
The other pathway is through the construction of risks in ethnically strongly divided societies. In 
such settings, different groups do not regard their risks as shared risks, but instead try to distance 
themselves from other groups, in order not to be associated with the problem (Lieberman 2007). 
Such societies generally tend to capture social issues along these lines, even when the risk in fact is 
not related to certain ethnicities at all. This is not only because of perceived emotional costs, but 
also due to material benefits, like better jobs, that are expected when being member of an ethnic 
group with a good reputation. Again, this is even more true due to special characteristics of 
HIV/AIDS. Out of fear that their own ethnic group is associated with the stigma surrounding the 
disease and in order to avoid repercussions, ethnic groups may seek to promote their own group’s 
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status by pointing out that it is limited to other groups, due to “their behavior and (lower) sense of 
morality and decency” (Lieberman 2007, 1412). 
Broad policies to fight the epidemic are unwanted as well as regarded unnecessary in the first place, 
not to deprive individuals from the help they need, but rather to avoid shame through association. 
Political leaders need to calculate whether the benefits of any such policies, even for those groups 
opposing them, are worth the resistance they are most likely to face. Due to the little demand, 
respectively the high resistance, leaders in such countries therefore have strong disincentives for 
large scale-efforts to fight HIV/AIDS. The underlying logic is therefore similar to the first mech-
anism – citizens fail to overcome the collective action problem.  
With all this being said, it is important to point out that ethnic fragmentation does not equal ethnic 
division, i.e. there does not necessarily have to be some kind of conflict (Youde 2007). In countries 
that are ethnically fragmented – but not as divided – citizens share a common identity. They there-
fore tend to understand risks as shared and are less likely to actively resist policies to fight the 
epidemic on the grounds of ethnicity (Lieberman 2007; Putzel 2004). 
Stemming from the two mechanisms explained here, the third hypothesis follows:  
H3 The more legitimate the nation state and the higher the identification with it, the higher 
leaders’ political will to fight HIV/AIDS. 
4.3. Scale of the epidemic 
Finally, it is the scale of the epidemic itself that can be expected to give leaders incentives to respond 
to the epidemic. The more spread the disease is in a country, the higher should be demand by the 
population for the government to act (Justesen 2012; Dionne 2011). Though it initially seems sim-
ilar to the democracy argument, I also expect authoritarian leaders to show more political will in 
the face of a large-scale epidemic. Since the virus largely ignores existing privileges, the more wide-
spread it is, the higher is the chance that also members of the political elite, or from the direct 
environment of the (authoritarian) leader are personally affected by the disease. So even the most 
malevolent dictator conceivable who would otherwise not care about the needs of the population 
should be expected to have some interest in fighting the epidemic, as soon as family members, 
friends or important members of staff are dying because of the disease. As Putzel (2004, 26), points 
out for the case of Uganda, 
“there were few families in the country, including the families of most major political actors, who 
were not affected by HIV/AIDS […] everyone knew someone who had died as a result of the virus 
and the images of its impact, at least in the urban areas, were pervasive. Doctors could not cure 
their own brothers and, money and privilege was no shield to the virus.” 
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A similar story can be told for Zambia, where the son of then-president Kaunda died of AIDS and 
the fight against the disease in turn became an import issue on the presidential agenda (Bor 2007). 
This suggests my fourth and last hypothesis:  
H4 The larger the scale of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, the bigger the political will of leaders to 
fight it. 
HIV prevalence has previously been used as control variable (e.g. Desmond et al. 2008; Bor 2007; 
Nattrass 2008). While high prevalence is associated with increased efforts to tackle the disease in 
most of these studies, they offer no theoretically compelling reason why this is the case. By making 
it an independent variable, this study is able to achieve this. 
 
5. Method and data  
5.1. Dependent variable 
Even more difficult than defining political will is measuring it. Due to the nature of the concept, 
revolving around intent and willingness, it is impossible to measure political will directly. As it thus 
remains a latent concept, “researchers have struggled to ﬁnd workable measures” (Bor 2007, 1587) 
for quantitative analyses. One common approach in the literature has therefore been to measure 
political will in terms of policy outcomes (Brinkerhoff 2000; 2016; Post et al. 2010). A positive 
outcome therefore serves as an ex post indicator that political will existed at a prior point.  
In general, policies on HIV/AIDS can be divided into two categories: prevention of infection and 
treatment of the disease (Gizelis 2009; Dionne 2011). However, when it comes to political will, 
measures based on preventive policies (e.g. the number of new infections) are problematic. Since 
the exposure to risks of infection largely depends on the individual behavior, it is to a meaningful 
degree out of the governments’ direct control (Justesen 2012). This is further complicated by the 
sensitivity of many preventive policies to local culture and traditions (Gizelis 2009). Besides that, 
measuring political will for example by the number of distributed condoms has also been criticized 
as reflecting a “Western bias” (Bor 2007, 1587), as it does not account for other, possibly contro-
versial methods of prevention which might be pursued by national governments. Also, simply 
counting the number of deaths caused by AIDS is deceptive. Due to the long time between infec-
tion and eventual death, this measure is more apt for long-time studies, with different aims and 
research questions. 
Using measures of treatment therefore appears to be the better option. As national governments 
are the key actor in assuring access to and availability of treatment, they also have a bigger and 
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more direct role in ‘producing’ the outputs (Justesen 2012). Partly, this is also because provision 
with treatment does not face the same resistance based on culture as many of the preventive poli-
cies. In recent years, the provision with ART has become one, if not the central pillar in the fight 
against HIV/AIDS (Desmond et al. 2008; Lieberman 2007). Whereas such a therapy in the begin-
ning was only affordable for the rich, especially in the western countries, since the mid-2000s there 
has been a sharp increase in the developing world as well, including Sub-Saharan Africa. This is 
exactly the time period of observation in this study. Globally, between 2010 and 2015 alone, the 
number of people living with HIV who have access to ART has more than doubled from 7.5 
million to 17.0 million (UNAIDS 2016). In this study, ART coverage, the percentage of all people 
living with the virus who have access to such a therapy, is therefore facilitated as the dependent 
variable (see next chapter, for how exactly the variables is employed). The data on ART coverage 
come from UNAIDS, but was retrieved from the World Bank (2017a), as their database covers all 
years since 2000.5 For some countries, UNAIDS does not provide country estimates. While most 
of them are very small countries, with Ethiopia and Nigeria also Africa’s two most populated coun-
tries are missing.  
Justesen (2012) has pointed out the crucial role of governments, when it comes to providing access 
and funding to ART. It is also due to already decreasing donor funding for HIV/AIDS that political 
will has become more and more important to sustain and expand ART coverage (Goldberg et al. 
2012). From a methodological standpoint, it is furthermore of importance that the provision with 
ART is a sufficiently complex task, requiring skilled staff, technical and administrative guidelines 
as well as a functioning system for the distribution of medication. It is thus not subject to “easy 
fixes” (Mette Kjaer 2004, 391), but instead requires profound changes and genuine political will by 
political leaders (Desmond et al. 2008). It is for these reasons that ART coverage has also been 
used by other authors as a proxy for political will (see e.g. Justesen 2012; Desmond et al. 2008; 
Nattrass 2008). It should therefore be a valid measure. Furthermore, in an exploratory factor anal-
ysis conducted by Gore et al. (2014) ART coverage turned out as a strong indicator for political 
will. Yet, ART is only one aspect of the policy response that is necessary to combat HIV/AIDS 
and therefore possibly provides only an incomplete picture of the underlying political will. Bot-
swana for example is successful in providing treatment to people living with the disease, yet is 
considered only substandard when it comes to preventing new infections in the first place (Fox et 
al. 2011). Furthermore, coverage “says nothing about the overall quality of treatment” (Desmond 
et al. 2008, 111). However, ART coverage “has the advantage of being the most widely reported 
outcome variable available” (Nattrass 2008, 399). Another possible measure which has been used 
                                                          
5 Due to improved methods for estimating HIV/AIDS data, these numbers are updated frequently. All numbers 
used in this study are as of May 2017. 
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in multiple studies is the prevention of mother-to-child transmission. Yet, whereas data on ART 
treatment is available from 2000, data on PMTCT coverage is only available from 2010 and there-
fore cannot be used for the research design of this study. Furthermore, the data are less reliable 
than those on ART (Nattrass 2008).  
However, it should not be left out that there has been some justified criticism of using outcomes 
as measure for political will. The main issue is that it can be seen as tautological, measuring political 
will “in terms of the output it is supposed to foster” (Gore et al. 2014, 103). While there is definitely 
some truth to this argument, it is more of a concern when political will is the independent variable, 
explaining the variance in ART coverage (or any other outcome). Because then, it “simply becomes 
a synonym for success” (Youde 2007, 2), without providing an explanation why success occurred. 
In this study, however, political will is the dependent variable, analyzing exactly these origins of 
political will. Much more, I take the positive relationship between political will and favorable out-
comes for granted and rather concentrate my study on what influences political will in the first 
place. The problem of tautology is thus largely avoided. Still, this does not imply that political will 
and the output are equated. By controlling for various factors which are “beyond the control of 
governments” (Bor 2007, 1586), it should be possible to isolate the effect of political will on the 
outcome (see Figure 1). 
More generally, Post et al. (2010) note that political ‘will’ by definition is only intentional. Measuring 
outcomes would extend this definition to action. Similarly, other studies (e.g. Lieberman 2007) use 
the frequency the topic was mentioned in speeches. Despite not being feasible for the scope of this 
study, “talk is cheap” (Mearsheimer 2010, 383). Often, verbal commitments and public announce-
ment do not translate into appropriate action (Fox et al. 2011). Especially in the context of Sub-
Saharan Africa, there should be some concern regarding approaches that ignore the actual conse-
quences. Not least as these are some of the same leaders who keep promising to fight corruption 
and economic development to their citizen as well as the international donor community. An out-
come-based measure is not prone to such “political ploys” (Post et al. 2010, 656). Another common 
strategy is to commit institutionally by setting up agencies or programs to fight HIV/AIDS but 
underfund them, so they only remain empty shells. However, there is not sufficient data to use this 
budgetary dimension of political will as measurement for a quantitative study. Similarly, differenti-
ating between the expressed, budgetary and institutional dimension, Fox et al. (2011) develop a 
measure of political will. Yet they do not provide data for this purpose, as it is rather intended as a 
guide for qualitative researchers. 
Besides outcome-based measures of political will, there have been attempts for more sophisticated 
ones. The most prominent one is the AIDS Program Effort Index (API) which for example has 
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been used by Bor (2007) or Dionne (2011). Besides being only conducted in two waves in 2000 
and 2003, and therefore not covering enough years necessary for this study, it also has some major 
methodological drawbacks (Goldberg et al. 2012; Gore et al. 2014; Bor 2007). The index largely 
relies on subjective judgements of a small group of local informants, mainly government officials 
and civil society activists which make it vulnerable to bias, misperceptions and misinterpretations. 
Due to local contexts, respondents may have different expectations which in turn influence their 
judgements. In lack of common standards, richer countries thus tend to be held to higher standards 
and rated harsher when it comes to questions like the adequacy of the response to the epidemic. 
Comparisons across countries are therefore barely possible. Informants could furthermore feel 
pressured or motivated to over- or underestimate their country’s performance, in order to protect 
its reputation, respectively to criticize the government. It is for these reasons that both the validity 
and reliability of the measure have been seriously questioned (Gore et al. 2014; Goldberg et al. 
2012). The API is therefore sufficient for its original purpose, serving as basis for evaluation and 
monitoring of national policies, but not for cross-country scholarly research. Another more recent 
measure (data collected in three rounds in 2010, 2012 and 2014) is the United Nations General 
Assembly Special Session on HIV/AIDS (UNGASS) National Commitments and Policies Instru-
ment (NCPI) (UNAIDS 2014). It is based on the API and therefore shares many of its flaws, even 
though to a lesser extent, due to some revisions (Goldberg et al. 2012; Gore et al. 2014). However, 
due to the previous difficulties of ranking countries using the API, no index is computed anymore, 
thus making the NCPI impractical for a quantitative study (Gore et al. 2014). Despite the flaws that 
come with using an outcome-based measure of political will, the alternatives are not convincing 
either. Instead, they pose some even bigger problems regarding validity and reliability.  
5.2. Research design 
As previously laid out, political will has to be sustained over time. For this reason, a research design 
was developed that accounts for long-term commitment. Measurement of ART coverage is not 
only taken at a single point in time, but instead at t1 and again at t2 which is three years later.
6 The 
dependent variable used for the analysis is therefore the absolute change in coverage during this 
time. Not only is this important for conceptual reasons, but it also accounts for the fact that policies 
need some time for implementation and to show effect. Furthermore, in order not to ‘mix up’ 
political will of different leaders and to account for changes that come as a consequence of changes 
in government, the timing of measurement is different for each country. Previous studies have 
                                                          
6 The time span of three years was chosen for reasons of measurement, mainly to assure that the respective leader is 
still in office.  
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failed to account for this by only measuring at a single point in time and this point in time being 
the same for all countries. 
When working with changes over time, the question arises whether to use absolute or relative 
changes. As there is no generally right answer, it is a rather subjective decision on what to use; both 
have their pros and cons (Desmond et al. 2008). It would be reasonable to argue that when country 
A doubles coverage from 25% to 50%, it is more impressive than a likewise increase by 25% from 
60% to 85% in country B. However, extending coverage from 1% to 2% is not that impressive, 
even though it is a change by 100%. On the other hand, due to diminishing marginal returns, once 
coverage is already high, further expanding it by a certain percentage becomes more difficult. In 
this study, I opt for absolute changes. This is not least because the global increase in ART coverage 
has been following a linear trend instead of an exponential one, indicating that relative changes are 
negligible. Desmond et al. (2008) do the same when using ART coverage in their study. 
The starting date for measuring (t1) is the year when elections were held and therefore a new gov-
ernment took office, or the existing government was confirmed. In presidential systems, which 
constitute the majority in Sub-Saharan Africa, this is therefore the date of the presidential elections, 
whereas for the few parliamentary systems the date of the parliamentary elections is taken. For 
semi-presidential systems, the date of the election of the president is chosen, as the holder of this 
office tends to be more powerful than the prime minister (Jahn 2013). The years of the elections 
come from the National Elections across Democracy and Autocracy (NELDA) dataset (Hyde & 
Marinov 2012).7 This is also the time of measurement for the independent variables, as well as the 
control variables. Their measurement differs slightly compared to that of the dependent variable, 
as they are only measured once at the time of the elections. While it would have been best to always 
begin the analysis in the year a completely new government took office, due to the many long-time 
rulers in the region, this would have reduced the number of possible cases too much. I am further-
more aware that quite many of these elections can hardly be labelled ‘democratic’. However, re-
search from the field of democratization studies suggests that having flawed elections is still better 
than having no elections at all (Edgell et al. 2017; Lindberg 2009). 
Following this approach, the base years for this analysis vary between 2006 (one case) and 2012 
(six cases). Starting from around 2005, there is steady increase in ART coverage both globally and 
in the region (World Bank 2017a). However, as already mentioned this increase is almost perfectly 
linear. It should therefore not matter, whether the timing of measurement for a country was for 
example between 2006 and 2009 or 2011 and 2014. This is confirmed through further checks, as 
                                                          
7 For South Sudan, the 2011 independence referendum was chosen as the starting date. In Eritrea, no elections took 
place on the national level since its independence in 1993. The country was therefore, excluded from the analysis. 
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there is no significant correlation between the base year and the change in ART coverage. The 
choice of the base year should therefore not influence the results. 
As already explained, the reason for choosing the year of election as the starting date is to have a 
clear cut between different office holders. An additional benefit of this approach is that times of 
change, like after elections, tend to be conductive to reform, as they can open a window of oppor-
tunity (Fox et al. 2011; Brinkerhoff 2000; Mette Kjaer 2004). Even though “old brooms can sweep 
too” (Mette Kjaer 2004), i.e. they can possess political will as well, the likelihood for reforms is 
higher with new governments. This can be for reasons that they are granted a “honeymoon” (Mette 
Kjaer 2004, 390) period by the public after taking office or the fact that they are less entangled in 
patronage networks – at least in the beginning. A prominent example is the case of South Africa, 
where newly-elected president Zuma drastically turned away from former president Mbeki’s con-
troversial position on HIV/AIDS (Brinkerhoff 2016).8 
To test the hypotheses laid out above for linear relationships, I am using multivariate regression by 
employing the method of ordinary least squares (OLS). All statistical analyses were conducted using 
IBM SPSS Statistics 24. Even though the factor time is of importance in this analysis, a cross-
sectional time-series analysis does not seem necessary, as the focus here is only the difference be-
tween two times of measurement and not the developments in the time between. 
5.3. Independent variables 
Based on the theoretical considerations above, four independent variables are included in the re-
gression models: the threats to leaders, the level of democracy, state identity and the scale of the 
epidemic. 
To test the first hypothesis, I am including the variable “exit” from the Archigos dataset (version 
4.1) (Goemans et al. 2009; Goemans et al. 2016). This variable indicates whether a political leader 
lost power through regular means or whether he/she “was removed in contravention of explicit 
rules and established conventions” (Goemans et al. 2016, 3). To give an assessment of the threat a 
leader is facing, for every country the number of irregular removals that took place in the past is 
used. The higher this number, the shorter the time horizon can be expected to be. To acknowledge 
the increasing number of peaceful transitions due to democratization processes in the region in 
recent years, and therefore an on average reduced threat of coups, only irregular removals which 
took place in the 20 years before measurement are taken into account. This should approximate 
the risk assessments of the leaders more precisely. The advantage of this measure is its wider scope, 
                                                          
8 In fact, the government’s position already began to change during transitional president Motlanthe’s seven-month 
tenure. 
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compared to just counting the number of successful coups. By accounting for all types of irregular 
exits from power, it includes for example irregular, yet peaceful removals by other government 
actors, or popular protest that brought down leaders. The number of incidents is therefore consid-
erably higher than for measures solely based upon the number of coups. Nevertheless, it does still 
not capture all possible threats. In established democracies, the time horizon of elected leaders is 
largely determined by the public and political support. Dionne (2011) therefore uses the margin by 
which the most recent election was won as a measure for the time horizon. However, in non-
democracies this number is meaningless. Accounting for this would therefore require splitting the 
dataset and use different measures for democracies and autocracies, as done by Dionne. Making a 
sharp cut between countries that are considered democratic and those ones that are authoritarian 
is always difficult. In the context of Sub-Saharan Africa, where most countries are somewhere in 
the middle this is barely possible, as any dichotomous separation would be more or less arbitrary. 
A further drawback of the measure used here is that it does not account for the fate of the leader 
after leaving office. As outlined earlier, the prospect of death, jail or exile can be expected to alter 
political will as well. Bor (2007) previously used the World Bank’s ‘political stability’ indicator. 
However, the focus of this measure is not on the leader itself, but rather on the country as a whole 
(Kaufmann & Kraay 2016). It therefore also includes general security aspects, making its scope too 
broad. 
One possible reason for the varying results of the impact of democracy outlined above, could be 
due to the differences in measurement. Often, democracy is just a dichotomous variable and there-
fore it is not accounted for different levels of democracy. Again, especially in the context of Sub-
Saharan Africa, with most countries being medium-level democracies, such a distinction is prob-
lematic. I measure the level of democracy by using the ‘electoral democracy index’ from the V-
Dem dataset (version 7) (Coppedge et al. 2017). Here, democracy is a continuous variable, based 
on Dahl’s (1989) understanding of democracy. This rather thin definition focuses on free and fair 
competitive elections, as well as freedom of expression and freedom of the press, since the latter 
two are necessary to ensure the former. Stemming from the theoretical considerations, these are 
the very aspects I am interested in, as I expect them to have an effect on the formation of political 
will. Another advantage of the measure is that it accounts for tactics of vote-buying and clientelism 
which effectively distort the will of the voters and are particularly wide-spread in Sub-Saharan Af-
rica (van Ham & Lindberg 2015). The variable runs from 0 through 1, whereas higher values indi-
cate a higher level of democracy. 
To operationalize the concept of ethnic division and the existence of a social contract (hypothesis 
3), I employ the variable ‘state identity’ from the Bertelsmann Transformation Index (BTI). The 
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scores themselves were retrieved from the Quality of Government Standard Dataset (version 
Jan17) (Teorell et al. 2017). The variable is a good fit for the concept, as it approximates the degree 
to which all major societal group accept the nation state as legitimate and agree about questions of 
citizenship (Donner et al. 2016). As already laid out when explaining the theoretical mechanism, 
ethnic fragmentation does not equal ethnic division. This is why this measure captures the theoret-
ical concept better than those measures, focusing solely on the degree of fragmentation, e.g. based 
on language or religion. The biggest problem with the measure is that it is not available for all 
countries. Some of the region’s smaller countries therefore could not be included in the analysis. 
Since state identity is a categorical variable, it is recoded into three dichotomous dummy variables 
for low, medium and high state identity. Based on the frequency distribution (see Appendix 1), 
values of 9 and 10 are coded as high state identity and values of 7 and 8 as medium state identity. 
Countries with values between 3 and 6 form the reference group of low state identity which is left 
out of the regression models.9 The coefficients for medium, respectively high state identity there-
fore show the difference to low state identity, the reference category. According to the theoretical 
considerations, both coefficients should be positive, that is ART coverage is higher when state 
identity is higher. Furthermore, the coefficient for high state identity should be bigger than the one 
for medium state identity. The BTI is only published bi-annually, therefore there are many cases in 
which the election was in a year in between, missing data therefore had to be interpolated. How-
ever, since identification with the nation station is something rather sticky, in most cases the value 
for the year before and the year after (e.g. 2010 and 2012) is the same. For the few cases, in which 
the value is different, the value from the year before is always taken, as it seemed more likely that 
identification changed after the elections, instead of before them.10 Other available measures of 
state legitimacy that were deemed adequate are either too old (Englebert 2000; Posner 2004) or 
only cover a few Sub-Saharan African countries (Gilley 2006). 
Measurement for the final independent variable is more straightforward. As measure for the scale 
of the epidemic, the log-transformed HIV prevalence is facilitated. This is an estimate of the per-
centage of adults, aged between 15 and 49 who are infected with HIV. The data come from UN-
AIDS (2017b). 
                                                          
9 There is no country in this sample with a score of 2 or lower. Even in the global Quality of Government dataset 
(1946-2016), there are only two country-years with a score of 2 – Côte d’Ivoire 2011 and Libya 2015.  
10 For South Sudan and Madagascar, the value from the year after was chosen, since no earlier measurement exists.  
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5.4. Control variables 
To make sure that any correlations between the policy outcome and the independent variables are 
due to differences in political will, this variable has to be isolated. To achieve this, six control vari-
ables are included in the regression. Furthermore, this accounts for the fact that societies do not 
“face the AIDS epidemic on a ‘level playing field’” (Desmond et al. 2008, 118), as countries have 
different abilities and preconditions, independent of their leaders’ political will. The control varia-
bles in this study are those country-specific factors which can be expected to be on the pathway 
from political will to ART coverage yet are not theorized to influence the formation of political 
will in the first place, as they only affect the outcome once political will has formed (see Figure 1). 
The control variables used here have frequently been used in other studies regarding development 
policy more generally and regarding AIDS policy in particular and/or have been suggested by other 
works discussed in the literature review. However, as already touched upon when reviewing the 
existing literature, some of these control variables have been used as independent variables before, 
thus suggesting they have an influence on political will. Yet, authors have not provided convincing 
theoretical explanations why leaders should be expected to stand back and watch the epidemic 
ravage their country, only because e.g. state capacity is low. Furthermore, when looking at the cases 
of Uganda and South Africa, this is also empirically doubtful.  
In general, wealthier countries perform better on many developmental indicators, as they tend to 
possess higher “human, ﬁnancial, and infrastructural resources” (Bor 2007, 1592). It should there-
fore be expected that a higher gross domestic product (GDP) per capita is also linked to more 
extensive ART coverage. The log-transformed GDP per capita is included based on purchasing 
power parity (PPP) in constant 2011 international dollars. The data come from the World Bank 
(2017b).11 Despite ensuring normal distribution of the data, the log transformation also accounts 
for the diminishing marginal returns of ART provision that come with higher income (Desmond 
et al. 2008). Even though there is a point in using averages of the GDP over the past few years in 
order to account for short-term fluctuations, this effect is likely to be offset by the fluctuations in 
prices for drugs and other goods that are necessary to fight the epidemic (Desmond et al. 2008). 
Not least because providing universal access to ART was one of three targets of MDG 6, most 
countries have received substantial foreign assistance to fight HIV/AIDS in general and expand 
treatment specifically (Nattrass 2008). Differences between countries regarding their success in 
doing so could therefore be rather due to these financial flows than due to political will (Post et al. 
2010). However, there is also research suggesting that levels of donor aid are actually driven by 
political will. This is, it is those countries which signal commitment to tackle the epidemic that 
                                                          
11 Somalia had to be excluded from the analysis at this stage, as no numbers on its GDP based on PPP are available.  
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receive additional support (Goldberg et al. 2012; Desmond et al. 2008). Furthermore, despite the 
substantial sources donors have at their disposal, they still require access to local communities 
which cannot be provided without the government (Dionne 2011; Desmond et al. 2008). Never-
theless, despite these concerns I chose to include donor aid in my regression models. Since the 
numbers on aid that is specifically earmarked to combat HIV/AIDS are only available for a few 
countries, I use the logged net official development assistance (ODA) received per capita. The data 
are coming from the World Bank (2017c). Another drawback of this measure is that it leaves out 
aid provided by nongovernmental actors. However, it should still provide an adequate picture. 
The problem brought up in the literature review, that the state apparatus has the potential to con-
strain government action, will be controlled for through two variables for state capacity and cor-
ruption in the public sector. Countries may indeed have a leader with sufficient political will, but 
lack the capacity to implement the necessary policies (Brinkerhoff 2016). States with higher capacity 
should do better at developing, coordinating and enforcing programs to fight HIV/AIDS and more 
specifically should perform better at providing ART treatment to all its citizens (Gore et al. 2014). 
According to Gizelis (2009), state capacity is of particular importance, when established social prac-
tices and human behavior is challenged – as is clearly the case for the issue at hand. To measure 
state capacity, I will employ the indicator for ‘government effectiveness’, from the World Bank’s 
Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI) (Kaufmann & Kraay 2016). This measure has been used 
before by Bor (2007) and is also recommended by Gizelis (2009). It uses a scale from -2.5 to +2.5, 
whereas higher values indicate higher effectiveness of the public service. Authors have also used 
the percentage of births attended by skilled health professionals as a proxy for the capacity of the 
health care systems. Countries with an already good health infrastructure should be expected to 
have an advantage when it comes to delivering ART. The measure, however, has shown not to be 
significant and also strongly correlates with the GDP per capita (Nattrass 2008; Bor 2007). It is 
therefore not included in the analysis. 
Corruption has been identified to have negative effects on a broad range of developmental out-
comes and is rampant in particular in the health care sector (Rothstein 2011). In this regard, the 
fight against HIV/AIDS is no exception. In sufficiently corrupt societies, resources earmarked for 
AIDS treatment do not reach those targeted – people in need of treatment (Gizelis 2009). Instead, 
access to treatment is distributed highly “unequally, based on favours, bribes and political privilege, 
rather than need” (Justesen 2012, 379). In order to control only for corruption in the state apparatus 
and exclude possibly corrupt behavior by the leaders themselves, I use the ‘public sector corruption 
index’ from the V-Dem dataset (Coppedge et al. 2017). As higher values indicate more corruption, 
a negative relationship should be expected. 
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It is generally more difficult to provide public services to people living in rural areas than to those 
living in urban centers (Desmond et al. 2008). This should be particularly true, for a task as complex 
and time-sensitive as ART treatment. Operating in urban areas is not only easier and cheaper from 
a logistic point of view, but also is this where donors tend to be located (Campbell 2010; Scott 
2000; Nattrass 2008). It can therefore be expected that ART coverage is higher in countries where 
people are concentrated in big cities, compared to countries where they are scattered over wider 
areas. The data on the urban population as percentage of the total population, come from the 
United Nations’ World Urbanization Prospects and are retrieved from the World Bank (2017d). 
Finally, I control for the colonial past. On many indicators of development, former British colonies 
tend to perform better, especially in comparison to former French colonies. I therefore include a 
dichotomous variable which is coded ‘1’ if the country is a former British colony, ‘0’ if the country 
had another or no colonizer.12 
 
6. Diagnostics 
Before running the regressions, respectively interpreting the results, it is tested whether the OLS 
assumptions are met.13 As could be expected, there is a very strong correlation between the control 
variables public sector corruption and government effectiveness. The Pearson’s r coefficient of -
.799 is significant and only marginally below the threshold of .8 (Field 2013). I therefore included 
two versions of the respective models that contain all control variables; one with the variable for 
government effectiveness and another one (labelled with the suffix ‘-a’), in which I dropped it. 
Correlations between all other variables are within the acceptable range (see Appendix 2). Espe-
cially the level of democracy as well as the GDP per capita moderately correlate with multiple other 
variables. Further checks for multicollinearity reveal no alarming values for the variance inflation 
factor (VIF) or tolerance (Appendix 3) (Field 2013). 
As can be seen in Appendix 4, the residuals are normally distributed. Their mean is pretty much 0 
and the standard deviation is less than 1 (.810). There are some deviations from the ideal line in the 
P-P plot, however, they are still within the range that is deemed acceptable. To test for homosce-
dasticity, the residuals are plotted against the predicted values (see Appendix 5). Some of the values 
are far off the y=0 line, meaning that the spread in the residuals for the predicted values varies. 
However, this variance follows no clear pattern. The assumption of homoscedasticity can therefore 
be regarded as being met. When testing for outliers, there is some concern regarding South Sudan 
                                                          
12 The coding is based on the work of Teorell and Wahman (2017). 
13 These tests were conducted using model 14, containing all variables. 
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and Rwanda (Appendix 6). The former is above -3 on studentized deleted residual, but its leverage 
is sufficiently close to the average. The latter on the other hand, has a leverage slightly above the 
calculated threshold of .73.14 However, not only is the leverage of no concern when using a less 
conservative cut-off, Rwanda’s residual is also unproblematic. Therefore, none of the countries 
exerts undue influence on the model.  
 
7. Analysis and results 
The scatterplots (Figure 2) only indicate a strong linear relationship between the HIV prevalence 
and the change in ART coverage, respectively a moderate relationship between the number of 
irregular exits and ART coverage. For the two other independent variables, the effect is only very 
weak. In the case of the level of democracy, it is even negative. However, as laid out previously and 
presented in Figure 1, this lack of a direct relationship does not pose a problem itself, as other 
factors are expected to intervene after political will has been formed and therefore to offset the 
effect of political will on ART coverage. 
In the following, each of the four hypotheses is tested separately, before being combined (model 
13 to 15). To allow for comparison between the different models, all models include only those 
cases, for which data on all variables is available. As mentioned before, the reduction to 33 cases is 
mainly caused by missing HIV/AIDS data and for state identity.  
                                                          
14 The threshold is calculated using the formula (2(k+1)/n) (Hoaglin & Welsch 1978); the less conservative formula 
according to Stevens (2009) is (3(k+1)/n). 
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Figure 2. Scatterplots of the dependent and the four independent variables.  
Table 1 presents the results of four different regression models. For the first model, a bivariate 
regression was run, testing only the effect of the independent variable on the change in ART cov-
erage. In model 2 and 2a the six control variables are added; as explained above, once including 
government effectiveness (model 2) and once without it (model 2a). The last model then includes 
only those control variables that were significant in the previous models. This approach is kept for 
the other hypotheses as well. 
In all four models, a higher number of irregular exits in the previous 20 years is related to less 
political will. However, only in the first model, when no control variables are included, the variable 
to measure the threat leaders face reaches significance on the .1-level. H1 can therefore only be 
accepted with some reservations. With each irregular exit of a political leader in the previous 20 
years, ART coverage on average decreases by 2.2% (model 1). 
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Table 1. Multiple regressions (OLS). The effect of the number of irregular exits in the last 20 years on political will, 
measured as change in ART coverage. 
DV: Change in ART coverage 
over three years 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 2a  Model 3 
Irregular exits -2.164* 
(1.155) 
-1.285 
(1.048) 
-1.269 
(1.027) 
-1.170 
(1.026) 
GDP per capita logged  -2.633 
(2.183) 
-2.824 
(2.030) 
 
ODA per capita logged  -2.714 
(2.071) 
-2.693 
(2.032) 
 
Government effectiveness  -.778 
(2.876) 
  
Public sector corruption  -15.283 
(9.187) 
-13.721* 
(7.016) 
-4.947 
(5.482) 
Urbanization  -.033 
(.098) 
-.030 
(.096) 
 
Former British colony  7.746*** 
(2.595) 
7.826*** 
(2.532) 
6.719*** 
(2.249) 
Constant 13.826*** 
(1.364) 
52.156** 
(22.357) 
52.891** 
(21.793) 
13.701*** 
(4.222) 
Adjusted R² .073 .353 .376 .339 
N 33 33 33 33 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ .1 **p ≤ .05 ***p ≤ .01.  
As presented in Table 2, in all models the level of democracy is negatively correlated with leaders’ 
political will to fight the epidemic, i.e. political will to fight HIV/AIDS is higher in less democratic 
countries. Except for the bivariate regression, this negative relation is significant at least on the .1-
level. Therefore, the independent variable reaches significance only once control variables are 
added. A stepwise regression reveals that while almost all control variables have a diminishing effect 
on the p-value, it is public sector corruption and government effectiveness which render the vari-
able significant and therefore offset the effect of democracy on ART coverage. This suggests that 
there might be an interaction between democracy and these two variables relating to the state ap-
paratus. 
These results are the opposite of what was to be expected beforehand. H2 must therefore be re-
jected. However, given the magnitude of a complete change from democratic (score of 1) to au-
thoritarian (score of 0), the additional increase in ART coverage of 18.7% (model 6) seems not very 
big. In this sample, the range is .58 between South Sudan (.23) and Mauritius (.81), suggesting a 
maximum increase in coverage of less than 11%. 
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Table 2. Multiple regressions (OLS). The effect of the level of democracy on political will, measured as change in 
ART coverage. 
DV: Change in ART coverage 
over three years 
Model 4 Model 5 Model 5a  Model 6 
Level of democracy -2.779 
(7.565) 
-19.780** 
(9.128) 
-15.571* 
(7.849) 
-18.730*** 
(6.692) 
GDP per capita logged  -2.607 
(2.048) 
-1.996 
(1.929) 
 
ODA per capita logged  -1.478 
(2.060) 
-1.850 
(2.013) 
 
Government effectiveness  2.867 
(3.144) 
  
Public sector corruption  -14.240 
(8.696) 
-19.014** 
(6.920) 
-14.829** 
(5.695) 
Urbanization  .040 
(.100) 
.015 
(.096) 
 
Former British colony  8.169*** 
(2.460) 
7.849*** 
(2.427) 
6.887*** 
(2.032) 
Constant 13.903*** 
(3.974) 
55.090** 
(21.189) 
52.056** 
(20.858) 
28.920*** 
(6.599) 
Adjusted R² -.028 .423 .426 .456 
N 33 33 33 33 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ .1 **p ≤ .05 ***p ≤ .01.  
Moving on to H3 which states that political will is higher in states that are more legitimate and are 
identified with to a larger degree, in model 7 the influence of medium state identity is significant 
on the .1-level (Table 3). High state identity on the other hand fails significance and only in model 
7 its effect points in the expected direction at all. Furthermore, the adjusted R² is only .075, this is, 
even less than 1% of the variance in the increase of ART coverage is explained by the model. Once 
the control variables are added to the model, neither medium nor high state identity are significant 
any longer. At this stage, H3 would therefore need to be rejected. 
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Table 3. Multiple regressions (OLS). The effect of state identity on political will, measured as change in ART cover-
age. 
DV: Change in ART coverage 
over three years 
Model 7 Model 8 Model 8a  Model 9 
Medium state identity 6.667* 
(3.576) 
1.835 
(3.215) 
1.844 
(3.148) 
3.128 
(3.260) 
High state identity 2.250 
(3.442) 
-2.992 
(3.073) 
-2.966 
(2.989) 
-1.034 
(2.998) 
GDP per capita logged  -2.253 
(2.066) 
-2.207 
(1.909) 
 
ODA per capita logged  -3.136 
(1.974) 
-3.141 
(1.933) 
 
Government effectiveness  .187 
(2.772) 
  
Public sector corruption  -18.037* 
(8.792) 
-18.406** 
(6.751) 
-8.868 
(5.394) 
Urbanization  -.081 
(.097) 
-.082 
(.095) 
 
Former British colony  6.642** 
(2.671) 
6.622** 
(2.602) 
5.768** 
(2.420) 
Constant 9.000*** 
(3.004) 
55.678** 
(21.697) 
55.464** 
(21.032) 
15.396*** 
(4.618) 
Adjusted R² .075 .410 .433 .365 
N 33 33 33 33 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ .1 **p ≤ .05 ***p ≤ .01.  
The only hypothesis that can be accepted without limitations is H4. As can be seen in Table 4, 
throughout all four models, HIV prevalence is significant at least on the .05-level. In the final model 
even at .01. As expected, the harder a country is hit by the epidemic, the more political will is 
mustered by leaders to expand coverage of ART. Since HIV prevalence was logged, a 1% increase 
in HIV prevalence, leads to a 0.033% increase in ART coverage. All other variables constant, for 
example a 20% increase in coverage would therefore require prevalence to be roughly 615% higher. 
As much as 615% sound initially; a country at the lower end of the sample like Madagascar, would 
still be on a lower level than Côte d’Ivoire (prevalence of 3.8%) by such an increase which is also 
still below the mean of 5.9%. The median in this sample is 2.7%. Departing from there, a 615%-
increase would equal the HIV prevalence in South Africa (19.2%), the third-highest in the sample. 
It is furthermore noteworthy that unlike in the other regressions, British colonial heritage fails 
significance.  
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Table 4. Multiple regressions (OLS). The effect of the prevalence rate on political will, measured as change in ART 
coverage. 
DV: Change in ART coverage 
over three years 
Model 10 Model 11 Model 11a  Model 12 
Prevalence rate logged 3.732*** 
(.858) 
2.409** 
(1.026) 
2.414** 
(1.006) 
3.260*** 
(.873) 
GDP per capita logged  -1.849 
(2.022) 
-1.940 
(1.872) 
 
ODA per capita logged  -2.462 
(1.933) 
-2.450 
(1.895) 
 
Government effectiveness  -.366 
(2.678) 
  
Public sector corruption  -14.398 
(8.566) 
-13.651** 
(6.474) 
-8.379* 
(4.766) 
Urbanization  -.071 
(.092) 
-.070 
(.090) 
 
Former British colony  4.144 
(2.855) 
4.175 
(2.792) 
 
Constant 8.221*** 
(1.386) 
44.137** 
(20.984) 
44.480** 
(20.437) 
14.399*** 
(3.762) 
Adjusted R² .359 .438 .459 .399 
N 33 33 33 33 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ .1 **p ≤ .05 ***p ≤ .01.  
Finally, in models 13 through 15 all independent variables are included. Along the lines of the 
previous models, the first model in the table includes only the independent variables and dependent 
variable, whereas in the other models a varying number of control variables are added. As can be 
seen from Table 5, the previous results are largely confirmed. Except for model 14 and 14a, HIV 
prevalence continues to be significant. As could be expected, due the higher number of variables 
in the model the size of the effect is smaller (2.260 in model 15, compared to 3.260 in model 12). 
In all models, the direction of the effect for the level of democracy (H2) continues to be in the 
opposite direction as hypothesized. In model 15 this is even significant. The variable measuring 
irregular exits points in the right direction in all models, yet it fails to reach significance. This there-
fore gives further reason to decline H1. Thus, both hypotheses relating to the leaders’ time horizon 
have to be rejected. However, some new support is lent to H3. In model 15 medium state identity 
is not only significant on the .05-level, also the size of the coefficient is bigger than in those models 
including state identity as the only independent variable. On average, in countries with medium 
state identity, the increase in ART coverage can be expected to be almost 7% higher than in coun-
tries with low state identity (reference category). Turning to high state identity, even though the 
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direction of the effect is in the expected direction in all models except 14a, it still not only fails to 
be significant (p-value of .176 in model 15), the coefficient is also smaller than the one for medium 
state identity. This suggests that medium state identity is more conducive to political will than high 
state identity. H3 can therefore still only be accepted with some serious caveats.  
Table 5. Multiple regressions (OLS). The effect of the number of irregular exits, the level of democracy, state iden-
tity and the prevalence rate on political will, measured as change in ART coverage. 
DV: Change in ART coverage 
over three years 
Model 13 Model 14 Model 14a  Model 15 
Irregular exits -.709 
(1.132) 
-.503 
(1.189) 
-.729 
(1.135) 
-.020 
(1.014) 
Level of democracy -3.386 
(6.461) 
-15.070 
(12.636) 
-9.574 
(10.007) 
-16.900** 
(7.161) 
Medium state identity 5.280* 
(3.102) 
4.570 
(3.679) 
3.775 
(3.474) 
6.898** 
(2.760) 
High state identity 2.953 
(3.208) 
.927 
(4.162) 
-.023 
(3.908) 
3.921 
(2.819) 
Prevalence rate logged 3.169*** 
(1.018) 
1.259 
(1.206) 
1.322 
(1.190) 
2.260** 
(.937) 
GDP per capita logged  -2.370 
(2.009) 
-1.977 
(1.914) 
 
ODA per capita logged  -1.606 
(2.079) 
-2.026 
(1.975) 
 
Government effectiveness  2.375 
(3.272) 
  
Public sector corruption  -15.138* 
(8.392) 
-18.427** 
(6.988) 
-17.632*** 
(5.751) 
Urbanization  .006 
(.117) 
-.028 
(.105) 
 
Former British colony  4.554 
(3.125) 
4.379 
(3.082) 
 
Constant 7.639* 
(3.916) 
51.173** 
(21.352) 
49.789** 
(21.038) 
25.815*** 
(6.845) 
Adjusted R² .348 .474 .485 .503 
N 33 33 33 33 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ .1 **p ≤ .05 ***p ≤ .01.  
In these models, public sector corruption is the only control variable that achieves significance. 
British colonial history, which was significant in some of the previous models, fails to achieve 
significance once including multiple independent variables. Besides these two, no other control 
variable is significant in any of the models. Comparing the standardized regression coefficients (see 
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Appendix 7), the beta of -.533 for public sector corruption suggests that its effect is stronger than 
the effect of HIV prevalence (beta of .373) and medium state identity (.483). The question is there-
fore, whether political will is sufficient in highly corrupt societies. However, to gauge the size of 
the effect more adequately, the standardized coefficient is only of limited help. Looking at the 
unstandardized coefficient instead, the scale of the variable for public sector corruption has to be 
kept in mind, as it only runs from 0 to 1. If for example a country like Mali (.70) managed to reduce 
corruption by .5 and therefore ended up on the same level as Botswana (.20) – the least corrupt 
country in this sample – it could expect to increase ART coverage by an additional 8.8%. However, 
given what a big accomplishment such a reduction in corruption would be and how few countries 
have managed something similar in the recent past, the effect of corruption on ART coverage 
seems not too big. Since corruption in the public sector is the one control variable being significant 
in most of the regression models, I tested its effect in a bivariate regression, in order to eliminate 
the possibility that all observed effects are only due to this variable. As can be seen in Appendix 8, 
not only is the regression coefficient smaller than in model 15 (-13.9 compared to -17.6), also is the 
adjusted R² only .149. The explanatory power of corruption therefore only increases together with 
other independent variables. 
Finally, despite dropping four respectively five (model 14a) variables, in model 15 the adjusted R² 
increases to .503 and the coefficient of the constant is cut by half (from 51.2 to 25.8). This implies 
that even though half of the variance in ART coverage is explained by the model, it still leaves 
room for other factors which were not accounted for in this analysis. This could also include the 
idiosyncratic aspects of political will.  
Given the previous literature, the weak results regarding threats to leaders (H1) are surprising. To 
test for robustness, the regressions are therefore repeated with a different measure to make sure 
these results are not due to a flawed operationalization. Despite the concerns voiced earlier, I am 
using the number of successful coups in a country. Like with the initial variable, only the past 20 
years are taken into consideration. This data come from Powell and Thyne (2011; 2017). As can be 
seen in Table 6, the number of coups is significant in all models but the last one. The original 
measure on the other hand only achieved significance in the first model. The regression coefficient 
is also higher (-3.0 compared to -2.2). Since this measure also fails significance in the final model, 
it does not lend sufficient support to accept H1 now, however, it gives a more nuanced picture, 
suggesting that the results on the influence of the threats to leaders on political will are not conclu-
sive yet. 
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Table 6. Multiple regressions (OLS). Robustness check on the effect of the number of coups d’état in the last 20 
years on political will, measured as change in ART coverage. 
DV: Change in ART coverage 
over three years 
Model 16 Model 17 Model 17a  Model 18 
Coups -3.001** 
(1.404) 
-2.255* 
(1.245) 
-2.202* 
(1.217) 
-1.884 
(1.219) 
GDP per capita logged  -2.873 
(2.120) 
-3.137 
(1.982) 
 
ODA per capita logged  -2.647 
(2.003) 
-2.620 
(1.970) 
 
Government effectiveness  -1.122 
(2.796) 
  
Public sector corruption  -17.600* 
(8.885) 
-15.316** 
(6.713) 
-6.120 
(5.241) 
Urbanization  -0.31 
(.095) 
-.028 
(.093) 
 
Former British colony  7.330*** 
(2.520) 
7.454*** 
(2.460) 
6.252*** 
(2.247) 
Constant 14.061*** 
(1.361) 
55.525** 
(21.778) 
56.487** 
(21.294) 
14.949*** 
(4.204) 
Adjusted R² .100 .394 .413 .362 
N 33 33 33 33 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ .1 **p ≤ .05 ***p ≤ .01.  
 
8. Conclusion 
This study analyzed how contextual factors influence the political will of leaders in Sub-Saharan 
Africa to fight HIV/AIDS. Political will was operationalized as the expansion of ART coverage 
during the first three years after elections took place. The thesis contributes to the literature on 
political will and HIV/AIDS in at least three ways. First, to the best of my knowledge it is the first 
attempt to systematically analyze the factors that influence political will, by coming up with a co-
herent underlying theoretical framework that distinguishes between factors that influence political 
will and those which only affect the outcome after political will has already been formed. Secondly, 
since most of the existing work dealing with political will and HIV/AIDS has been of qualitative 
nature, this large-N study adds to the question whether these results can be generalized. Finally, in 
doing so, by adjusting the year of measurement for every country, a methodology was chosen that 
does not ‘mix up’ the political will of different leaders within a country. Previous studies have not 
accounted for this. 
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Building on political economy, the threats political leaders face (H1), level of democracy (H2), 
legitimacy of and identification with the nation state (H3) as well as the scale of the epidemic (H4) 
were hypothesized to influence the political will of leaders to fight HIV/AIDS. Out of the four 
hypotheses, only H4 could be accepted unconditionally, H3 only with some caution. Both hypoth-
eses relating to the leaders’ time horizon, H1 and H2, had to be rejected, therefore contradicting 
previous findings. However, using a different operationalization, the robustness check for H1 rel-
ativized the initial results, suggesting that the findings on the influence of the threats to leaders on 
political will are not conclusive yet and more research needs to be done on this, beginning with 
new measures to better capture the concept. However, the fact that H2 had to be rejected, while 
H4 was accepted provides additional evidence that the micro-mechanism linking higher prevalence 
rates and higher political will is not simply driven by popular demand, something implicitly sug-
gested in the previous literature. Instead, this supports the idea that it is the personal stake of leaders 
that increases their political will. As H3 could only be accepted with some caveats, a puzzle is posed 
by the finding that medium state identity appears to be more conducive to political will than high 
identification with and legitimacy of the nation state. A possible explanation could be that there is 
a certain threshold of state identification, only below which the negative effects unfold. State iden-
tity would therefore have to be treated as a dichotomous concept, rather than a continuous one.  
H2 had to be rejected as the results for the influence of democracy were not only negative but also 
significant. They therefore further add to the inconclusive and at times contradictory literature on 
the effect of democracy on fighting HIV/AIDS. There are several possibilities for this being the 
case. As pointed out, for electoral accountability to create political will, HIV/AIDS has to be on 
the agenda of the voters. Surveys suggest that often this is not the case. Further studies should 
therefore account for these preferences, even though there might be limitations in the availability 
of data. Even more, the characteristics of the disease could be counterproductive for building po-
litical will for fighting it. As Scott (2000, 588) puts it: 
“there are votes to be gained from dramatically feeding people who are in danger of starving, while 
there are no votes to be gained from constantly reminding people that certain enjoyable private 
activities are eroding their life-expectancy.”  
Leaders in less democratic countries on the other hand are able to enforce unpopular decisions, 
without having to worry about electoral repercussions limiting their time horizon. This would be 
in line with the findings by Putzel (2004) for Uganda. Another avenue for future research could be 
to take a closer look at whether the choice of the system of government, this is presidential or 
parliamentarian, has an influence on building pollical will, as the degree to which minorities are 
represented varies between these systems. Such a study would have to be extended beyond Sub-
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Saharan Africa, as only five countries in the region have a parliamentarian system. From a statistical 
point of view, the explanatory power of the results might be impaired due to the small range of .58 
of the variable measuring democracy in this sample. Even more, according to the ordinal version 
of V-Dem’s electoral democracy index, only Mauritius qualifies as ‘democratic’ by having a score 
above .8.  
In this analysis, contextual factors were able to explain half of the variance in political will when it 
comes to fighting HIV/AIDS (model 15). Notwithstanding other factors that were not accounted 
for, this suggests that still a considerable share of political will stems from the personal traits of 
individual leaders. To fully grasp political will, qualitative studies looking into personal motives and 
preferences therefore continue to be necessary. 
From a policymaker’s perspective, these results are rather disappointing, as it seems there is little 
that can be done from the outside to overcome the limiting factors of political will. Raising HIV 
prevalence in order to raise ART coverage clearly is against all logic. However, the results indicate 
that leaders show commitment once they are personally affected. In a wider sense, this suggests 
that actors trying to bring forward policy change should work much more on the individual level, 
pointing out personal benefits. Even though this is not necessarily in line with the typical under-
standing of a public service ethos. Democracy, which is considered a universal remedy in some 
development circles, turned out to be counterproductive. But as the case with HIV prevalence, 
reducing democracy aid is not an option either. Even if it as in impediment to expanding ART 
coverage, there are other intrinsic values. Out of all independent variables, identification with the 
nation state, by (re-)constructing a shared social contract might be the hardest one to achieve 
(Persson & Sjöstedt 2012). In the long term, practitioners who seek to increase access to ART 
therefore might be best off when aiming to tackle corruption, as it poses an enormous stumbling 
block on the pathway from political will to increased coverage. 
One of the biggest limitation of this study is that due to the availability of data, only 33 countries 
could be analyzed. While from a statistical point of view, this is still a sufficient number of cases to 
generalize from the sample to the population, the relatively small sample size makes it harder to 
find significant results in the data. A logical next step would therefore be to increase the number 
of cases by extending the scope to other regions where HIV/AIDS poses a problem, in particular 
Asia and Latin America. Alternatively, e.g. all countries with a generalized epidemic could be stud-
ied. However, in these cases it would be necessary to account for regional differences.  
Another limitation of this study is that it does not look into specific features of the various polities, 
as each of them have different and unique party system and veto players (Tsebelis 2002). Also, 
aspects of fragmentation or polarization within the government could play a role (Mette Kjaer 
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2004; Post et al. 2010). However, by limiting the study to countries within Sub-Saharan Africa, 
these factors were mitigated to some extent, as differences within the region should be smaller than 
in comparison to countries from different regions. 
However, the biggest limitation is the measurement of political will itself. I am aware that meas-
urement of political will is the principal flaw of any such study, as it can by definition only be 
approximated and not measured directly. However, given the importance of political will for public 
policy, despite these limitations scholars should not shy away from researching it and instead come 
forward with new, innovative ways to operationalize the concept. Even though, much like in pre-
vious studies measurement of political will has been “indirect and retrospective” (Post et al. 2010, 
670), the results could be as a first step to help estimating political will beforehand in the future. 
At least to some extent, the approach could therefore serve as an ex ante “assessment tool” 
(Brinkerhoff 2000, 248) to identify the presence of political will in advance. To make statements 
about the degree to which the results of the present study can be generalized, further studies cov-
ering other policy areas for which political will is a crucial prerequisite seem necessary. 
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Appendix 2: Correlations between the independent and control variables 
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Appendix 3: Collinearity statistics 
 Tolerance VIF 
Irregular exits .536 1.866 
Level of democracy .184 5.447 
Medium state identity .248 4.026 
High state identity .180 5.563 
Prevalence rate logged .416 2.405 
GDP per capita logged .278 3.595 
ODA per capita logged .499 2.004 
Government effectiveness .188 5.318 
Public sector corruption .256 3.907 
Urbanization .338 2.962 
Former British colony .326 3.066 
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Appendix 4: Distribution of the residuals 
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Appendix 5: Test for heteroscedasticity  
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Appendix 6: Test for outliers  
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Appendix 7: Standardized regression coefficients 
 Standardized regression coefficients 
Beta 
Irregular exits -.003 
Level of democracy -.400 
Medium state identity .483 
High state identity .285 
Prevalence rate logged .373 
Public sector corruption -.533 
 
 
 
 
Appendix 8: Bivariate regression public sector corruption – ART coverage  
DV: Change in ART coverage over three years  
Public sector corruption -13.858** 
(5.400) 
Constant 21.835*** 
(3.801) 
Adjusted R² .149 
N 33 
Standard errors in parentheses. *p ≤ .1 **p ≤ .05 ***p ≤ .01.  
 
